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Introduction 
 In 1989 Poland, Hungary and East Germany abandoned communism and broke free 
of the Iron curtain. Then, on December 26th of 1991, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
officially dissolved ending nearly 70 years of communism in Europe. Following these events 
a rapid large scale social, political and economic transition took place. Many of these 
countries adopted new constitutions and became democracies, closely aligning themselves to 
Western Europe and the United States. However, with these profound political, social, and 
economic changes occurring in Eastern Europe, scholars observed another trend: increasingly 
lower fertility rates.  
 In the years following the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact (the defense treaty that 
united the USSR with the rest of the Eastern Bloc), it became evident that the fertility rates in 
the former Warsaw Pact countries were declining. However, not only were the fertility rates 
in these countries declining; they were declining to some of the lowest levels in the world. In 
her article “The Post-Communist Fertility Puzzle”, social demographer Sunnee Billingsley 
states “As of 2004, 15 countries of the former Soviet Union (FSU) and Central and Eastern 
Europe (CEE) have entered lowest-low fertility (fertility rates at 1.3 or under)  at least once” 
(Billingsley 2009, 194). Additionally, many Eastern European countries continue to have 
some of the lowest birth rates in the world, with eight former Warsaw Pact members being 
found in the bottom 20 countries with the lowest fertility rates in the world, the largest 
proportion of countries to share a geographic region in the bottom 20 (Central Intelligence 
Agency n.d). Interestingly, this drop in fertility has coincided with the various social and 
economic changes that have swept across region since the fall of communism, asking the 
questions of could the phenomena be related?   
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Author Background 
 Social and political issues taking place within Eastern Europe, and, notably, Poland, 
are of great interest to the author. The author is the child of Polish immigrants living in the 
United States, and also has several family members currently living in Poland. Additionally, 
the author himself identifies as both a Pole and an American, holding citizenships to both 
countries. Culturally, the author is closely connected to his family’s homeland as he speaks 
Polish fluently and has visited Poland several times.  
Structure of the Paper 
 In this paper I will examine the decline in fertility in the post-communist countries of 
Europe. For the most part, I will be using the blanket term of “Eastern Europe” to refer to 
these countries, as that is the official term the United Nations uses. Although, at times, I will 
also use the term Central Europe to refer to Eastern European countries that are 
geographically closer to Western Europe.   
In order to conduct my analysis I have gathered data in regards to fertility in Eastern 
Europe from before and after the 1989 revolutions. Amongst this data I have gathered actual 
fertility rates, which are measured using the standard Total Fertility rate (TFR) defined by the 
World Health Organization as the ”total number of children born or likely to be born to a 
woman in her life time if she were subject to the prevailing rate of age-specific fertility in the 
population” (The World Health Organization n.d). To supplement my data on fertility rates, I 
have also a looked at factors such as GDP, democratic stability, and death rates. Furthermore, 
I have examined the social changes in Eastern Europe in a more qualitative manner through 
examining news articles and videos, documentaries, and other forms of media. Finally, I have 
looked at some of the arguments put forth by other scholars in regards to why this drop in 
fertility has taken place.  
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  However, there are some important limitations to take into consideration in 
examining the data. Mainly, there has not been a lot of research done on Warsaw Pact 
demographics that is not tied to Soviet propaganda pre-1989 (Wertherell and Plakans 1997, 
245). It is a similar situation for data on pre-1989 GDP’s as well, as the Soviet Union would 
record its GDP data inaccurately (Balcerowicz 2002, 36). As a result, the pre-1989 
demographic and economic statistics that will be provided in this paper may be skewed.  
In regards to how I have conducted my research, there are also limitations that must 
be taken into consideration. Notably, the purpose of this paper is to provide a general 
overview of the fertility decline in Eastern Europe. Thus, my research is not all 
encompassing, and I will not be focusing on every country that is considered to be in the 
region. Additionally, many of the conclusions that I will be coming to will be generalizations 
based on observed trends throughout the region. In regards to this I would like to highlight 
that Eastern Europe is a large and culturally diverse area, and that the social, economic, and 
cultural circumstances do differ significantly from country to country.   
In terms of how my analysis will be presented, I have divided this paper into multiple 
sections. In the first section, I will take a closer look at the actual rates of fertility in Eastern 
Europe. In the second section, I will briefly explain the negative effects of the population 
decline in Eastern Europe. In the third section, I will discuss relevant history and background 
information. After explaining the  background information, I will then review existing 
literature on the fertility crisis in Eastern Europe in the fourth section. Mainly, this literature 
will focus on explaining the phenomenon. In the penultimate section I will examine the 
changes that have occurred throughout the region from a more qualitative approach. Finally, 
in the sixth section I will discuss my findings. I ultimately, aim to conclude that the various 
social and economic changes in Eastern Europe have impacted the fertility rates in the region.  
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The Numbers 
In recent years, as Eastern Europe has underwent it’s fertility transformation, various 
demographic organizations have been documenting Eastern Europe’s fertility trends.  
According to the United Nations World Fertility Patters report, the global total fertility rate is 
2.5 children per woman, with Europe having the lowest levels of total fertility in the world at 
1.6 (United Nations 2015, 3). In contrast, Africa, the continent with the world’s highest total 
fertility rate has a TFR of 4.7 children per woman (United Nations 2015, 3). Thus, the issue 
of low fertility rates seems to be one occurring in all of Europe. However in regards to 
Eastern Europe the United Nations reports that the fertility rates in Eastern Europe are some 
of the lowest in Europe (United Nations 2015, 3). The United Nations does report projected 
growth in Eastern Europe from a TFR of 1.6 to a TFR of 1.7 by 2030, however even this still 
puts Eastern Europe as the region with the second lowest TFR in Europe after Southern 
Europe (United Nations 2015, 22-24). While on the rise, it is important to consider that there 
was still a significant drop in fertility from about 2.1 between 1970- 1975 to about 1.6 from 
1990-1995  (United Nations 2015, 23). Additionally, even with the increase, a fertility rate of 
1.7 is still the below the replacement rate which according to the United Nations is at about 
2.1 children per women (United Nations 2017). Thus, even with a projected rise in fertility 
rates, the rates of birth in many Eastern European countries are still below replacement level.  
When examining these fertility rates more closely and by country, the numbers 
become even more severe. For instance according to The World Bank , in the year 2017 the 
total fertility rate was 1.2 for Moldova , 1.37 for the Ukraine, 1.38 for Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, 1.39 for Poland, 1.48 for Slovakia, 1.53 for Hungary, 1.54 for Bulgaria, 
Belarus, and North Macedonia,  1.58 for Slovenia, 1.6 for Estonia, 1.63 for the Czech 
Republic, 1.64 for Romania, 1.69 for Lithuania, and 1.76 for Russia (The World Bank, 2019). 
In comparison with the time period before the fall of communism many of these numbers are 
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drastically different. In 1980 the fertility rate was 2.48 in Moldova, 1.95 for the Ukraine, 2.1 
for Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2.28 for Poland, 2.32 for Slovakia, 1.91 for Hungary, 2.05 for 
Bulgaria, 2.03 for Belarus, 2.49 for North Macedonia,  2.06 for Slovenia, 2.02 for Estonia, 
2.08 for the Czech Republic, 2.43 for Romania, 1.99 for Lithuania, and 1.89 for Russia (The 
World Bank, 2019). Through this country by country analysis of TFR rates, it is evident that 
the decline of TFR rates in Eastern Europe is significate, and the actual scope of  the TFR 
drop becomes much clearer. 
What Low Fertility Rates Mean for Eastern Europe 
 The issue of declining fertility rates in Eastern Europe asks the question of what does 
this mean for Eastern European countries? In their paper Billari, Kohler and Ortega state that 
“lowest-low” fertility rates can have a drastic impact on a population, pointing out that a 
fertility rate of 1.3 will reduce a population in half every 45 years (Billari, Kohler and Ortega 
2004, 642). As one can imagine, the halving of a population in such as way creates a variety 
of social and economic issues within a country. In regards to Poland, a country with TFR of 
about 1.39 (The World Bank, 2019), Nalaskowski discusses how a low fertility rate will 
impact the population in regards to age. He brings up that with Poland’s dropping population 
the age of the country’s workforce is expected to drop by over 3.8 million by 2035, 
decreasing the number of people to take care of minors and the elderly by 18% and 
increasing the number of retirees dependent on working people (Nalaskowski 2014, 49). 
What this means for Poland is that there will be more citizens seeking retirement pensions 
from the government, and fewer people to generate wealth within the economy to sustain 
paying retirement pensions. The issue of aging populations is but one of the risks a country 
can face in experiencing a lowest-low TFR, and it is an issue that is already beginning to 
impact some Eastern European countries.   
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Background in Post-Communism 
 After the Second World War, most countries in Eastern Europe fell into the Soviet 
zone of influence. The Soviet Union worked to restructure the governments of these 
countries, forming communist parties to run the countries, and restructuring the economies of 
these countries (Bunce, 1985, 4-8). Resultantly, the divide between democratic Western 
Europe and communist Eastern Europe came into existence. This divide was known as the 
Iron Curtain, this name symbolizing the intensity of the Soviets desire to seal themselves and 
Eastern Europe off from the democratic West (Encyclopedia Britannica 2018). Eventually as 
a reaction to the creation of NATO these countries officially united their alliance in 1955 in 
the creation of the Warsaw Pact, a political and military organization (Remington 1973, 61). 
The official members of the pact were Poland, Romania, The Soviet Union, Albania, 
Hungary, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria (History.com, 2009). These Warsaw 
Pact countries stayed under Soviet influence for many years, however there had long been 
popular resistance among Warsaw Pact countries, such as with the Prague Spring in 1957 in 
Czechoslovakia or the Solidarność (Solidarity) movement in Poland in the early 1980s 
(Kramer 1989, 1535). Over the years these popular movements had their toll on the durability 
of Iron Curtain and of communism in Eastern Europe.   
 In the 1980’s the Iron Curtain’s stability was further weakened after Mikhail 
Gorbachev become the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 
1985. Gorbachev’s foreign policy towards Eastern Europe called for no military intervention 
on the U.S.S.R’s part in the case of communism collapsing in other countries, and thus many 
Eastern Europeans felt more empowered to fight for regime changes in their countries 
(Kramer 1989, 1535, 1545-1515).  Initially, Poland overthrew communism in a peaceful 
revolution through its Solidarność movement in 1989. Shortly after Poland, the East Germans 
were inspired to do the same, and after their peaceful revolution the Berlin Wall which had 
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divided communist East Berlin from democratic West Belin fell. It was demolished in 
November of 1989. Country after country, the anti-communist sentiment spread, leading to 
peaceful anti-communist revolutions in all of Eastern Europe (except in Romania), until 
finally the sentiment spread into the Soviet Union itself leading to its collapse in 1991 ( U.S. 
Department of State n.d). Thus, communism in Eastern Europe was over and the region 
found itself amid an economic, political, and social transition.  
 This transition phase is known as post-communism. More closely, post-communism 
is defined as “the cultural or political situation following or resulting from a period of 
communist government, now especially that of Eastern Europe in the late 1980s and early 
1990s” (Oxford Dictionaries.com n.d). Once it began, post-communism had a profound effect 
on the countries of Eastern Europe. Primarily, in post-communism one of the main goals of 
many former Warsaw Pact countries was to develop Western style democracies in their 
countries, with similar systems based on rule of law and checks and balances (Schopflin 
1991, 236). Post-communism has, accordingly, been a period of great change and transition 
for all Eastern Europe, as Eastern European counties have left communism and adopted 
Western forms of government.  
However, it is important to note that the political outcomes in these countries have 
been different. For instance, while a majority of former communist Eastern European 
countries have joined the European Union, there are still several countries that have not 
joined, those countries being Albania, Belarus, most of former Yugoslavia (except for Croatia 
and Slovenia), Moldova, Russia, and the Ukraine (WorldAtlas.com, 2018).. Some of these 
countries such as the Ukraine have been working more closely with the Union in recent 
years, others such as Bosnia and Herzegovina have applied for membership to the Union 
(WorldAtlas.com 2018). Russia, on the other hand, leads its own Political and Economic 
alliance with its former Soviet Republics, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 
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(CTGN 2017). The Economist’s World Democracy Index ratings of these countries also 
significantly differ, with the EU countries generally falling within the 6.0-7.99 (flawed 
democracy) range, the CIS countries falling within the 0.0-3.99 (authoritarian regime) range, 
and the unaffiliated countries such as the Ukraine or Serbia falling within the 4.0-5.99 
(hybrid regime) range. (The Economist 2019). Understandably, these political outcomes are 
not the only ways in which former Iron Curtain states differ from each other today.  
 Economically and socially, there have been large discrepancies as well. According to 
the 1999 report from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, for instance, 
mortality rates among males aged 40-59, which were relatively the same among all Eastern 
European countries in 1989, have drastically fallen in Central Europe countries, and risen in 
among the Baltic and CIS states (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 1999, 
15) The same report also shows a significant increase in poverty among CIS states since 
1989, and only a light to moderate increase in poverty for countries in Central Europe and the 
Baltic States (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 1999, 16). Finally, the 
report points out that since 1989 the real GDP rates of the Baltic States and Central Europe 
initially fell, but recovered and are on the rise, while those of the CIS states have tanked and 
plateaued at a level significantly lower than before (European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development 1999, 58). As can be seen from this data, while post-communism did create a 
wave of  sweeping changes throughout Eastern Europe, those changes have not been equal.   
A Review of Literature 
The alarmingly low rates of total fertility in Eastern Europe have prompted many 
scholars to examine the issue closely, and many have developed theories and hypothesis in 
order to explain the phenomenon. One popular theory that researches point to is the Second 
Demographic Transition Theory, According to Lesthaeghe the Second Demographic 
Transition or (SDT) has brought about developments form the 1970’s and onward that have 
   
    
 
Zgirski 9 
 
led to sustained sub-replacement fertility levels in Western countries, living arrangements 
other than marriage, disconnections between marriage and procreation, and a lack of a 
stationary population (Lesthaeghe 2014,18112). As for the reasons behind SDT Lesthaeghe 
discusses the importance of higher order needs, that is, an increase in education and growth 
of income, more expressive and existential needs, self-actualization, and individual autonomy 
(Lesthaeghe 2014, 18114). Thus, according to the SDT theory a change in values and a 
cultural shift from a materialistic society to a post materialistic one leads to a decrease in 
marriage, a lack of interest in procreation, and an increase in migration, all of which 
negatively impact fertility.  
Scholars have examined this the theory in order to explain the current demographic 
crisis in Eastern Europe. For example in regards to Russia, Zakharov strongly argues for an 
SDT as being the reason why fertility rates are declining in that country. To make his point 
he examines marriage rates in Russia. He notes that Russians born in the 1970’s and onward 
have received more post-Soviet socialization (Zakharov 2008, 932). He then notes that this 
cohort has  higher rates of older marriage, higher rates of non-marital cohabitation, and 
higher rates of birth outside of marriage than before (Zakharov 2008, 934).  He also points 
out that the fertility of women under the age of 20 has almost halved in recent years 
(Zakharov 2008, 936). Zakharov ultimately looks at the correlation between marriage and 
fertility rates and argues that the changes in Russian marriage patterns are indicators of an 
SDT occurring in Russia. Similar to Zakharov, Walford and Kurek also look at SDT 
indicators  such as lower TFR rates, an increase in extra-marital unions, and a higher child 
bearing ages, but in Poland. They find that those phenomena are happening in Poland since 
the 1990’s in ways that are relatively comparable to how they happened in England and 
Wales, countries considered to have already undergone SDT’s (Walford and Kurek 2015, 
512-514). Accordingly, Walford and Kurek, too claim that an SDT is occurring in Poland.  
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On the other hand, another theory, referred to as the economic crisis theory, that has 
been advanced by scholars examines the effects economics have on a population’s fertility 
rate. Billingsley summarizes this theory, originally pioneered by Becker (1960). According to 
Billingsley this theory claims that fertility is based upon the cost of children, which are 
mediated by household income (Billingsley 2009, 197). In this theory, the direct and indirect 
pros and cons of having children are weighed against the costs and the household income, 
thus in a region with economic turbulence, such as Eastern Europe during the post-
communist transition, fertility would decline, as families decided that they cannot afford a 
child.  
In regards to this theory there have also been several scholars who have been 
supportive of it. Corina and Paniccià (1996), for instance, argue that the cost of marriage and 
creating a family is higher for those at younger ages in several Eastern European countries 
and that economic difficulties have worsened these cost for younger couples, leading to 
marriage at a later age. They also point to unemployment as a factor in the later age of 
marriage and postponement of child bearing in these countries (Corina and Paniccià 1996, 
14). They argue that this along with an increase of male migration and male mortality have 
led to there being less women married while younger and more fertile, which they correlate 
with lower TFR rates (Corina and Paniccià 1996, 15). They also point out that as a result of 
the transition from communism the price of raising a child has skyrocketed, and that 
government financial incentives to support fertility have been less effective due to this 
increase (Corina and Paniccià 1996, 15). Corina and Paniccià thus conclude that the drop in 
fertility rates in the countries they examined is an outcome of greater societal changes, which 
stem from economic hardship. 
An issue that has been pointed out about the economic crisis theory, however is that it 
examines the relationship of fertility and economics from a macro scale. For example, in their 
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analysis of fertility patterns and economic uncertainty in Russia during the 1990’s, Kohler 
and Kohler come to conclusions that contradict the economic theory. Initially they note that 
in a macro analysis of fertility rates and economic disparity, the two are related with a strong 
correlation existing between the fall of the Gross National Product of Russia in the 1990’s 
and Russia’s TFR drop during that period (Kohler and Kohler 2002, 237-239).  However, 
while their initial findings seem to support the economic crisis theory, Kohler and Kohler 
point out that from a micro analysis the situation is different. Their micro analysis findings 
show that childbirth is actually positively correlated with male unemployment, male unpaid 
wages, and female unpaid wages (Kohler and Kohler 2002, 246-249). These findings show 
that while the economic crisis theory may be effective in conducting a macro analysis of 
fertility declines, it might not always work in regards to analyzing fertility declines among 
individuals.   
Other scholars have taken a look at both the SDT theory and economic theory in order 
to come to their conclusions. Sunnee Billingsley argues that the decline in birth rates across 
Eastern Europe can be related to an SDT, or the economic crisis theory. She notes, however, 
that the applicability of these theories varies by different groups of countries. She found that 
most countries experienced postponement after the transition and that in many countries the 
postponement was positively tied to economic growth. In her findings, the countries that 
experienced stopping of births in lieu of postponement, or significantly less postponement, 
experienced more economic struggle after the transition from communism (Billingsley 2009, 
202-211, 220). Billingsley’s research seems to support either an SDT in countries where 
postponement was correlated with economic growth and stopping of births in counties that 
were economically damaged, supporting the SDT theory and Becker’s (1960) economic 
analysis of fertility.  
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 Other scholars have reached similar conclusions to Billingsley. For instance Philipov 
and Kohler conclude in their paper that the quantum of fertility (the number of children born 
to a women during her lifetime) has decreased in both Russia and Bulgaria, while that has not 
been the case in Poland, Hungary, or the Czech Republic, which have been more 
economically well off than the former. Those countries rather experienced tempo effects (a 
change in the timing of when a women choses to have a child) (Philipov and Kohler 2001, 
55). Similarly,  Sobotka, also states that the positive economic changes in the economically 
more successful Eastern European countries effected what fertility looked like in those 
countries, leading to a postponement in childbirth, while lower economic conditions in 
countries such as Russia led to people having less children and at younger age (Sobotka 
2003, 476-477).  Like Billingsley, several other scholars agree that an SDT encouraged 
postponement occurred in Eastern Europe in countries that were socially and economically 
better off, while a stopping occurred in countries that struggled as a result of the transition. It, 
thus, seems that this approach is gaining popularity and traction in academic circles. 
 Besides the SDT theory or the economic crisis theory, scholars have advocated for 
other explanations of the TFR changes in Eastern Europe. Like the SDT theory, Thornton and 
Philipov make an ideological argument, however the way in which they view this ideological 
shift differs from a traditional SDT approach. In their research Thornton and Philipov claim 
that Eastern Europeans had observed the increasing tolerance of pre-marital sex, abortions, 
cohabitation, and same sex marriage in Western European Countries during the late 20th 
century (Thornton and Philipov 2007, 51). They also argue that after the fall of communism, 
Eastern Europeans turned their attention to Western European countries which they saw as 
more modern, successful, and developed (Thornton and Philipov 2007, 28). Accordingly, the 
increasingly lower birth rates in Eastern Europe stem from an ideological shift. However 
unlike traditional SDT arguments, according to this argument the shift results from Eastern 
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Europeans adopting Western European values which they saw as conducive to success and 
modernity; there is less of a focus on self-actualization.  
 Another contribution to the debate points to capitalism itself as the catalyst for the 
TFR trends in Eastern Europe. In his paper Frejka states that the change from a planned 
socialist economy to a free market one is the root cause of the fertility decline in Eastern 
Europe (Frejka 2008, 160). He claims that the social conditions in communist Eastern Europe 
were favorable to childbearing due to conditions such as free housing, free education, and a 
lack of career opportunities. He then points out that the transition to a capitalist system raised 
the costs of goods, increased competition among workers, created new career opportunities, 
put pressure to pursue higher education, and decreased state welfare, resulting in conditions 
that negatively impact fertility (Frejka 2008, 161). Frejka’s argument examines the social and 
economic conditions in Eastern Europe. His examples do not necessarily contradict an SDT 
or an economic crisis, but rather tend to show that an SDT or economic crisis stem from 
transition to capitalism. Ultimately he claims that the transition to capitalism itself is the 
culprit behind Eastern Europe’s decline in fertility. 
Finally, a recent theory used to explain declining birth rates in Europe focuses on the 
postponement of birth to a later age. In their research, Billari, Kohler and Ortega highlight 
that in recent years in Southern, Eastern and Central Europe the mean age of a women’s first 
birth has been increasing annually (Billari, Kohler, and Ortega 2004, 644). This results in the 
fertility rates of these countries being lowered. Billari, Kohler and Ortega also point out that 
this postponement likely stems from a lack of employment opportunities, and that people are 
choosing to delay having children to an older age to find work or obtain an education (Billari, 
Kohler, and Ortega 2004, 655-656). This ties the theory very closely with the economic crisis 
theory proposed earlier, however there is also more to this theory than the economic aspect.  
Billari, Kohler and Ortega further point out that this postponement creates a social feedback 
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loop. That is, people look to others to see when they had children, social norms are created in 
regards to when to have children, people choose to get married later for economic stability 
and better quality partners, and childlessness begins to make people more competitive in the 
employment marketplace (Billari, Kohler, and Ortega 2004, 657-659). In summary, 
according to this theory postponement occurs as a result of socioeconomic factors that lead 
people to choose to have children later when they are more financially stable. This creates a 
social feedback loop in which society encourages postponement, lowering the countries 
fertility rate over time. 
From examining the literature surrounding the fertility decline in post-communist 
Eastern Europe , it is clear that the Second Demographic Transition Theory and Becker’s 
(1960) theory of economics and fertility are some of the most common explanations for the 
decline. Some scholars have examined the Eastern European region using only one of the 
aforementioned theories, while others have chosen to examine countries separately to find 
which explanation fits best with a given country. However, there is another group of scholars 
that have used explanations other than an SDT or economic crisis.  For example these 
scholars have attributed the TFR decrease in Eastern Europe to the region comparing itself to 
the West, transitioning to capitalism, and people postponing childbearing to wait for better 
financial stability. Yet this third group of scholars still focuses on new cultural, and economic 
influences, such as proponents of an SDT or economic crisis. All in all, while there are many 
different explanations on the specific reasons behind the fertility decline in Eastern Europe, 
there is consensus that the TFR declines are related to cultural and economic changes. 
Changes: The People’s Point of View 
 In the years since the transition, the various changes in the societies of Eastern Europe 
have been massive, especially from the people’s point of view. In my own experience as a child 
of Polish immigrants, I have heard my parents talk about these changes when my family would 
   
    
 
Zgirski 15 
 
visit Poland during my childhood. My mother, for example, to this day consistently brings up 
supermarkets, and how they have revolutionized grocery shopping in Poland. My mother 
always says that during her childhood the stores were small, clerks would fetch items for people 
to buy from usually empty shelves, and the lines were huge. People were also given food ration 
cards, and people could only buy food allocated to them through those cards. Today, my mother 
says, thanks to supermarkets, getting a healthy amount of food is actually possible in Poland, 
and it is quick, convenient, and easy. Not only that, but my mother also says that the 
introduction of supermarkets in Poland makes the country feel more modern, and more 
Western, something which she appreciates. This introduction of supermarkets has also 
happened everywhere in Central Europe and even in countries like Russia (Machek 2012; 
Tracey and Wilson 2019). The introduction of supermarkets may not seem important, however, 
it is an indicator of the economic, social, and cultural changes that have happened in Eastern 
Europe since the transition. 
 In general this transition has also created significant cultural changes within Eastern 
European countries. For instance there is a growing sense of freedom, self-autonomy, and care-
freeness found in the cultures of the region. Euronews shows an example of this in a short video 
clip. In the clip, they interview a 27 year old Polish man who gives historic tours of Warsaw. 
In regards to Poland’s new sense of freedom he says “My generation, is the first generation for 
the last 200 years that didn’t fight for anything” (Euronews 2014, 00:07:08). In a different part 
of the video clip a tailor, Tomasz Clapala, notes that he feels free and happy in regards to how 
easily he can now travel with his Polish passport (Euronews 2014, 00:03:04). In Hungary this 
sense of freedom can be observed through simply walking the streets of a larger city such as 
Budapest. In the “Budapest” episode of Rick Steves’ Europe, Rick Steves’ points out that 
Budapest has only grown more lively since the fall of communism, with the camera panning 
to show a shot of people sitting in cafés, sipping beer, eating dinners at restaurants and enjoying 
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life in a care-free manner (Rick Steves’ Europe 2004, 00:24:35). The people of both Poland 
and Hungary feel a sense of freedom in their countries that hasn’t been felt in generations, and 
they are grateful for it.  
Now, it is an established fact that the changes in Eastern Europe have been unequal, 
and rather negative  for some, however these cultural feelings freedom, autonomy, and worry-
freeness are even felt in the Eastern European countries that are typically considered “less 
developed”. For example in the Ukraine, these changes can be seen through the fact that in 
2019  the Ukraine hosted it’s largest ever and least violent Pride parade in Kiev. The event had 
thousands of marchers for LGBTQ equality, and only a handful of counter-equality protestors 
(Schaaf 2019). In Russia this new sense of freedom can be observed through experiencing the 
hustle and bustle of Moscow, which the BBC presents in their documentary series World’s 
Busiest Cities. In the episode “Moscow” (2017), journalist Anita Rani discusses the new sense 
of freedom and westernization that Muscovites feel as the city is modernizing, while visiting 
Krymskaya Embarkment, a new park built in downtown Moscow from a carpark. As the 
camera pans to show people enjoying the park she says “loads of people just hanging out, 
enjoying each other’s company, dudes on skateboards. We might take this for granted back 
home, but it’s a really new thing for Moscow”  (BBC 2017, 00:48:50). In spite of the highly 
unequal impacts of post communism, a significant cultural change has occurred across Eastern 
Europe, in which people feel freer. 
Nonetheless, while Eastern Europe has experienced this cultural change and new sense 
of freedom, there are still many countries in the region where people have been negatively 
impacted by the transition, and this is an important factor to consider. For example, today many 
Romanians are forced to work in textile factories for low wages and in abhorrent conditions, 
essentially working in sweat shops  This can be seen in a short video from Arte by Eberhard 
Rühle. In the video Carmen Ciobanu leaves her home every morning after 4 AM to travel to 
   
    
 
Zgirski 17 
 
Bucharest where she works as a textile worker. Her working conditions are abusive and her 
wages are low, but she is poor and has no choice but to work (Rühle 2017, 00:00:10). The 
situation is similar in Bulgaria. Euro News’s journalist Daniel Bellamy, notes that despite an 
increase in minimum wage, Bulgarian workers still endure the lowest minimum wage in the 
European Union (Bellamy 2019, 00:00:02). In his video he also portrays  how workers such as 
Elena Marvakova also must endure sweat shop-like conditions in their jobs as textile workers 
(Bellamy 2019, 00:00:13). In the Ukraine the situation is just as bad, as can be seen in a video 
released by The World Bank. In the video a village pensioner Nadiia Khomenko is briefly 
interviewed and says “ I am poor. I don’t have enough money, even for a very simple life” (The 
World Bank 2018, 00:01:05). Eastern Europe is still a region with a significant amount of 
poverty and economic struggle, and while this is not the case for every country in the region , 
the issue is significant. Additionally, through my own experience, even in a country like Poland 
that is considered to be relatively well off in Eastern Europe, a significant portion of people 
live poorly, with many families being forced to live in old and cramped communist-era 
apartment blocks, as they cannot afford more modern and larger housing.  
Since the transition from communism there have been a lot of social changes 
throughout Eastern Europe  For one, institutions such as the supermarket have been introduced, 
indicating modernization and westernization in the region. People all over the region have also 
been experiencing a new sense of freedom that has encouraged phenomena such as Pride events 
or simply the kind of care-free café lounging that has been enjoyed in Western Europe for 
years. Although, even with these changes it is important to note that there are still many 
countries struggling with poverty and economic stagnation, and that not all Eastern Europeans 
are necessarily well off  because of the transition. However even in considering those negative 
impacts the positive social changes are substantial, as even countries such as Russia or the 
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Ukraine, that are generally considered to be on the less fortunate side of the transition, have 
experienced them.  
Conclusion 
The changes that have occurred in Eastern Europe since the transition, align with the 
demographic theories that have already been discussed in this paper. For instance the issue of 
low wage sweat shop labor in Romania and Bulgaria (Bellamy 2019; Rühle 2017) goes hand 
in hand with the Economic Crisis theory, as in such conditions people work difficult jobs for 
little money and may not be able to afford many children. While the introduction of Western 
institutions such as the supermarket in Poland or the new sense of freedom felt in cities like 
Moscow (BBC 2017) could indicate a change in values and an increase in individual 
autonomy which in turn could indicate a Second Demographic Transition or maybe a desire 
to be like Western Europe as claimed by Thornton and Philipov (2007). In synthesizing the 
different theories and data in this paper together, there is strong evidence that Eastern 
Europe’s social and economic changes have influenced the fall in fertility. However further 
research would need to be conducted in order to confirm that.   
Concludingly, there could be a multitude of reasons as to why fertility rates in Eastern 
Europe have fell so drastically in recent years. However, through the data presented in this 
paper it is clear that in the years since the fall of communism in Europe, Eastern Europe has 
experienced a significant number of social and economic changes that have coincided with 
the fall of fertility in the area. Ultimately, the manner in which these social and economic 
changes coincide with the fertility fall and align with theories on demographic change, makes 
it highly likely that these social and economic changes have influenced the fertility fall in 
Eastern Europe. 
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